Enhancing Border Security, Immigration, and Trade

Figure 4: U.S. Port of Entry at San Ysidro, California 

port of entry san ysidro, california

Source: GAO.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated how weak border security measures could be exploited to a tragic end. While federal agencies have taken a number of steps to strengthen border security, such as enhancing passport and visa security procedures and deploying additional personnel and technology overseas and at the borders, challenges remain. DHS also faces obstacles in identifying and removing millions of undocumented aliens from the country, denying unauthorized aliens the ability to obtain employment, and providing immigration services to eligible aliens in a timely fashion. Furthermore, DHS must balance these security responsibilities with challenges associated with its legacy customs revenue and trade functions as imports continue to significantly increase. Key challenges include the following:

  • The U.S. Border Patrol, part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol’s ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. For example, the Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program improvement.
    Highlights of GAO-09-824 (PDF)
  • Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to train officers to assist in identifying those individuals who are in the country illegally. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for supervising state and local officers under this program. ICE has designed some management controls to govern 287(g) program implementation, such as Memorandums of agreements and background checks of state and local officers, but the program lacks other controls, which makes it difficult for ICE to ensure that the program is operating as intended.
    Highlights of GAO-09-109 (PDF)
  • Weaknesses exist in detecting and interdicting the illegal flow of persons and cargo entering the country through ports of entry.
    Highlights of GAO-08-219 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-533T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-187 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-591T (PDF)
  • Cost, schedule and performance issues have delayed the successful deployment of DHS’s multiyear, multibillion Secure Border Initiative—designed to employ technology and infrastructure to detect and deter illegal entry between the ports of entry. With respect to the technology component of this initiative, known as SBInet, DHS has not effectively managed system requirements or testing. Moreover, the scope and timing of the SBInet capabilities to be deployed have continued to change and remain unclear. The deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border is nearing completion, but delays persist, due mainly to property acquisition issues. Despite the investment in tactical infrastructure, its impact on securing the border has not been measured because DHS has not assessed the impact of the tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of effective control. .
    Highlights of GAO-09-896 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1148T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-158 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF)
  • Concerns exist regarding the Border Patrol’s ability to provide adequate supervision and training to a large influx of new agents.
    Highlights of GAO-07-540R (PDF)
  • DHS has not yet implemented an exit capability for its US-VISIT program—a program to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign visitors at more than 300 ports of entry, and has not adequately defined, justified, or coordinated a strategic solution to enhance already deployed entry capabilities .DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program and the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution.
    Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-632T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-499T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-278 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-248 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-404 (PDF)
  • The paper-based employment verification system is easily undermined by fraudulent documents, while the electronic verification system is promising but is vulnerable to identity fraud.
    Highlights of GAO-08-729T (PDF)
  • Detention facilities’ compliance with DHS detention standards is mixed, and weaknesses exist in DHS’s compliance review process.
    Highlights of GAO-07-875 (PDF)
  • Antiquated technology and inefficient and ineffective paper-based processes inhibit DHS’s ability to process immigration benefits in a timely manner and to ensure that benefits are only granted to eligible aliens .
    Highlights of GAO-07-85 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-259 (PDF)
  • Challenges exist related to DHS’s customs revenue and trade functions, including insufficient staff, large balances of uncollected trade duties and penalties, lax oversight over the in-bond trade moving from one U.S. port to another, weaknesses in the management of intellectual property rights enforcement and collection risks, and limitations in the acquisition and deployment of a new trade processing system.
    Highlights of GAO-07-529 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-391 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-561 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-735 (PDF) and Highlights of GAO-08-46 (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

  • CBP needs to establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing through the checkpoint undetected and establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data.
    Highlights of GAO-09-824 (PDF)
  • DHS should strengthen controls for the 287(g) program, such as documenting the objective of the 287(g) program participants, clarifying when the 287(g) authority is authorized for use by state and local law enforcement officers, establishing a plan, including a time frame, for the development of performance measures for the 287(g) program.
    Highlights of GAO-09-109 (PDF)
  • U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) needs to (1) improve training for officers to enable them to better detect individuals attempting to enter the U.S. illegally at ports of entry and (2) implement key controls to better ensure that high-risk cargo containers are screened as intended.
    Highlights of GAO-08-219 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-533T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-187 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-591T
  • CBP needs to assess the risks associated with SBInet’s acquisition, development, testing, and deployment and provide DHS senior leadership and Congress with the results, including proposed alternative courses of action for mitigating identified risks. In addition, it needs to effectively implement rigorous and disciplined requirements management and test management practices. CBP also needs to conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of the tactical infrastructure’s contribution to border security.
    Highlights of GAO-09-896 (PDF) and Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-10-158 (PDF)
  • DHS needs to ensure that the strategic solution components for US-VISIT, including the solution for controlling and monitoring the exit of foreign visitors, is well-defined, economically justified, effectively coordinated with related programs, and managed in accordance with key acquisition practices. In particular, DHS needs to develop and maintain an integrated master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project.
    Highlights of GAO-10-13 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-361 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-1065 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-632T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-499T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-278 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-248 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-404 (PDF)
  • U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) needs to amend its compliance inspection process for detention facilities to better ensure that detained aliens can make telephone calls to access legal services, report complaints, and obtain assistance from their respective consulates.
    Highlights of GAO-07-875 (PDF)
  • U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) needs to develop a strategic workforce plan, strengthen performance measures, improve human capital management, create a strategy for communicating with employees and stakeholders, and ensure that information technology systems and services are acquired in a way that employs leading practices to support the transformation of immigration benefits processes.
    Highlights of GAO-06-259 (PDF)
  • DHS should develop a strategic workforce plan that aligns its human capital efforts with its objectives related to performing customs revenue functions and establish performance measures related to customs revenue functions and intellectual enforcement. In addition, DHS should improve data collection and analysis of its in-bond and intellectual enforcement activities and work with other relevant agencies to re-examine the current formulas for setting bond requirements to increase the amount of antidumping and countervailing duty revenue protected by general bonds.
    Highlights of GAO-07-529 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-391 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-561 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-07-735 (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk
GAO-10-158, January 29, 2010
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed
GAO-10-13, November 19, 2009
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed
GAO-09-896, September 9, 2009
Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness
GAO-09-824, August 31, 2009
Immigration Enforcement: Better Controls Needed over Program Authorizing State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws
GAO-09-109, January 30, 2009
Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program Planning and Execution Improvements Needed
GAO-09-96, December 12, 2008
Transportation Security Administration's Suspension of the Butane Lighter Ban Onboard Commercial Aircraft
GAO-09-177R, December 5, 2008
Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities
GAO-09-93, November 25, 2008
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment
GAO-08-1086, September 22, 2008
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers
GAO-08-533T, June 12, 2008
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Congress and Agencies Should Take Additional Steps to Reduce Substantial Shortfalls in Duty Collection
GAO-08-391, March 26, 2008
Homeland Security: Strategic Solution for US-VISIT Program Needs to Be Better Defined, Justified, and Coordinated
GAO-08-361, February 29, 2008
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed
GAO-08-187, January 25, 2008
Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry
GAO-08-219, November 5, 2007
Information Technology: Improvements for Acquisition of Customs Trade Processing System Continue, but Further Efforts Needed to Avoid More Cost and Schedule Shortfalls
GAO-08-46, October 25, 2007
USCIS Transformation: Improvements to Performance, Human Capital, and Information Technology Management Needed as Modernization Proceeds
GAO-07-1013R, July 17, 2007
Alien Detention Standards: Telephone Access Problems Were Pervasive at Detention Facilities; Other Deficiencies Did Not Show a Pattern of Noncompliance
GAO-07-875, July 6, 2007
Intellectual Property: Better Data Analysis and Integration Could Help U.S. Customs and Border Protection Improve Border Enforcement Efforts
GAO-07-735, April 26, 2007
International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System Impede Customs and Border Protection's Ability to Address Revenue, Trade, and Security Concerns
GAO-07-561, April 17, 2007
Information Technology: Near-Term Effort to Automate Paper-Based Immigration Files Needs Planning Improvements
GAO-06-375, March 31, 2006
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