

STRENGTHENING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT:
FOCUSING ON THE OPERATING AGENCIES

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INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF OUR CONFERENCE IS "PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: STRENGTH THROUGH CHANGE". THIS CONFERENCE IS BUT ONE EXAMPLE OF INDIVIDUALS COMING TOGETHER TO FIND WAYS OF BUILDING BETTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS. THE LESSONS WE SHARE IN THIS FORUM MAY COME FROM EXPERIENCE IN FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE IMPORTANT THING IS NOT THE SOURCE, BUT THE VALUE OF THAT EXPERIENCE. EACH OF US CAN--INDEED, WE MUST--LEARN FROM THE OTHERS.

AS MY CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROCESS OF SHARING IDEAS, I'M GOING TO TALK PRIMARILY ABOUT SOME OF THE THINGS WE NEED TO DO TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. BUT I BELIEVE MANY OF THESE THOUGHTS WOULD ALSO BE APPLICABLE TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

FOR MANY YEARS, EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE CENTERED ON SOLVING MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS THROUGH THE POWERS OF THE CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AGENCIES-- THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB), THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA), AND THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (OPM). THIS HAS BEEN A PRIMARY FOCUS GOING BACK AT LEAST AS FAR

AS THE HOOVER COMMISSION. BUT DESPITE THE DEDICATED EFFORTS OF MANY ABLE PEOPLE, THIS APPROACH HAS HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN PAST YEARS.

THE FAILURE OF THE TRADITIONAL CENTRAL AGENCY FOCUS HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED IN A VARIETY OF SOURCES. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, IN ITS REPORT REVITALIZING FEDERAL MANAGEMENT, POINTED OUT THAT, AT LEAST IN SOME AREAS, CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AGENCIES HAVE IMPEDED EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT, RATHER THAN PROMOTED IT.

AMONG THE KEY POINTS MADE BY THE NAPA PANEL ARE:

"THE DESIGN AND CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ARE TOO CENTRALIZED, EITHER WITHIN AGENCIES OR IN THE CENTRAL AGENCIES," AND

"SYSTEMS ARE TOO NEGATIVE AND CONSTRAINING."

THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COSTS CONTROL, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE GRACE COMMISSION, PROVIDED ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE SAME POINTS. IN ITS REPORT ON FEDERAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GRACE COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT--

"THE ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGEMENT...AMONG MANY AGENCIES HAS RESULTED IN UNCLEAR AND, IN SOME CASES, OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG AGENCIES; MAJOR GAPS IN ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS; UNCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND OTHER AGENCIES; AND AN INABILITY TO IMPLEMENT MAJOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH."

MY OWN AGENCY, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LOOKED CLOSELY AT THE HISTORY OF CENTRALLY DIRECTED MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS OR SO. THE RESULTS WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. WE FOUND A RECORD OF PERIODIC INITIATIVES, FEW OF WHICH HAVE MADE A LASTING IMPACT.

THIS RECORD IS NO ACCIDENT. RATHER, IT IS THE RESULT OF INHERENT LIMITS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF CENTRAL AGENCIES. LET'S CONSIDER THE DRAWBACKS OF THE CENTRAL AGENCY APPROACH. THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE OF THEM.

FIRST, THE CENTRALLY DIRECTED APPROACH CAUSES UNAVOIDABLE CONFUSION BETWEEN ISSUES OF PROGRAM POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION. NOW, THOSE ISSUES ARE CLEARLY RELATED; A POLICY CANNOT BE WISE IF IT CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED SUCCESSFULLY. LIKEWISE,

SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION DEPENDS ON EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT. BUT THE FACT THAT THE ISSUES ARE RELATED DOES NOT MEAN --CANNOT REALISTICALLY MEAN-- THAT THOSE WHO ARE SKILLED FOR INSTANCE, AT TRANSLATING THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA INTO MEANINGFUL POLICY OBJECTIVES ARE ALSO EXPERTS AT KNOWING HOW TO IMPLEMENT THOSE POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND SOUND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES.

SECOND, THE CENTRALLY DIRECTED APPROACH ALLOWS THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES TO ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE RESULTS OF THEIR ACTIONS. ALL TOO OFTEN, WE HAVE SEEN AGENCY OFFICIALS POINT THE FINGER AT OMB, OR GSA, OR OPM AND SAY--OR AT LEAST CLEARLY IMPLY --"THEY MADE ME DO IT THIS WAY." ALL TOO OFTEN, THEY CAN POINT TO A PARTICULAR REGULATION OR CIRCULAR WHICH SUPPORTS THIS DEFENSE.

THIRD, THE CENTRALLY DIRECTED APPROACH DIVERTS ENERGY AND ATTENTION FROM THE OPERATING AGENCIES, WHERE THE PROBLEMS REALLY ARE AND WHERE EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS MUST BE FOUND AND IMPLEMENTED. OMB, GSA, AND OPM CANNOT CREATE, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ON THEIR OWN; ONLY THE OPERATING AGENCIES CAN DO THAT.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

AS YOU MAY HAVE GATHERED, I DON'T BELIEVE WE CAN BUILD EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IF WE CONTINUE TO RELY SO HEAVILY ON THE CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AGENCIES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AGENCIES ARE UNIMPORTANT. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY AREAS WHERE CONSISTENCY AMONG AGENCIES IS NECESSARY. GOVERNMENT-WIDE FINANCIAL DATA, SUCH AS THAT IN THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET, IS ONE EXAMPLE. IN OTHER AREAS OF MANAGEMENT REFORM, THE CENTRAL AGENCIES CAN PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ENCOURAGING AND SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE OPERATING AGENCIES AND IN ENSURING THAT EXPERIENCES IN ONE AGENCY ARE SHARED WITH OTHERS. THESE CENTRAL AGENCY EFFORTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE SUBSTITUTES FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT OPERATING AGENCIES HAVE TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN THE PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT.

IF MANAGEMENT REFORM IS TO SUCCEED IN THE LONG RUN, I THINK WE MUST FOCUS MORE ON THE OPERATING AGENCIES THEMSELVES, AND ON WHAT THEY NEED IF THEY ARE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY. INITIALLY, AT LEAST, I THINK THAT MEANS FOCUSING ON THE TOP 20 OR SO OF THE LARGER AGENCIES. THAT IS WHERE THE DOLLARS ARE; THAT IS WHERE THE COMPLEXITIES ARE; AND IF WE ARE TO BE HONEST WITH OURSELVES, THAT IS WHERE THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS ARE.

I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT SMALL AGENCIES ARE UNIMPORTANT, OR FREE OF PROBLEMS; FAR FROM IT. MANY RELATIVELY SMALL AGENCIES-- INCLUDING GAO WITH A STAFF OF ABOUT 5,000--HAVE VITALLY IMPORTANT MISSIONS, AND THEY, TOO, FACE A VARIETY OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS. BUT THE KEY OPERATING FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT ARE CENTERED IN THE MAJOR DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

OUR GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE WORKING PROPERLY ONLY IF THESE LARGER AGENCIES--AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT--CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY. ACHIEVING THAT LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY DEPENDS ULTIMATELY ON HOW WELL THESE LARGER ORGANIZATIONS ARE MANAGED.

EACH MAJOR AGENCY IS UNIQUE. EACH HAS ITS OWN MISSION AND OPERATES IN ITS OWN ENVIRONMENT. IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANAGING A MILITARY SERVICE, WITH OPERATING UNITS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IS DIFFERENT FROM MANAGING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT. AND BOTH ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM MANAGING AN AGENCY, SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MOST OF WHOSE PROGRAMS OPERATE THROUGH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO SOLVE THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OF THESE AGENCIES? WE MUST START BY EMPHASIZING THAT EACH AGENCY IS A UNIQUE OPERATING SYSTEM. WE MUST IDENTIFY ITS PROBLEMS, AND DEVELOP SOLUTIONS WHICH FIT ITS SPECIAL NEEDS. SOMETIMES WHAT IS FOUND TO WORK IN ONE AGENCY WILL ALSO WORK IN ANOTHER FACING A SIMILAR PROBLEM. BUT WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO IMPOSE ON ONE AGENCY A SOLUTION THAT SUCCEEDED IN ANOTHER AGENCY FACING A DIFFERENT SET OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT.

THIS DOESN'T MEAN THAT SUCCESS IN ONE AGENCY IS IRRELEVANT TO THE OTHERS. ONE CONNECTION OF THIS SORT SEEMS FAIRLY OBVIOUS TO ME. IF OUR LARGER AGENCIES DEVELOP EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, A SMALLER AGENCY CAN TIE INTO ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE--SELECTING THE ONE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR ITS NEEDS--RATHER THAN SPENDING THE MONEY TO DEVELOP ITS OWN SYSTEM.

ALTHOUGH THE SOLUTIONS WE SEEK FIT THE SPECIFIC NEEDS OF EACH AGENCY, THE PROBLEMS WE FACE ARE SOMETIMES GENERIC, AND I BELIEVE SEVERAL OF THESE GENERIC PROBLEMS NEED IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

INSTABILITY OF LEADERSHIP

MANAGERIAL INSTABILITY, PARTICULARLY AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE GENERIC PROBLEMS THAT FACE MOST LARGE OPERATING ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. THE PROCESS OF SELECTING INDIVIDUALS FOR APPOINTMENT TO POLITICAL POSITIONS USUALLY GIVES FIRST PRIORITY TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE AND COMPETENCE ARE SOMETIMES SOUGHT, BUT USUALLY IN A WAY THAT MAKES THEM SECONDARY TO THE POLITICAL FACTORS. THIS IS PART OF OUR SYSTEM SINCE WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE IDEA OF HAVING OUR AGENCIES HEADED BY POLITICALLY RESPONSIBLE LEADERS. THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE WITH EACH ADMINISTRATION. THIS, TOO, IS PART OF OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM.

RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THAT INSTABILITY HAS INTENSIFIED. FIRST, THE POLITICAL LEVEL GOES MUCH DEEPER INTO THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE THAN IS OFTEN RECOGNIZED. SECOND, THE POLITICAL LEVEL CHANGES EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE EVERY 4 YEARS; THE AVERAGE IS MORE LIKE EVERY 2 OR 2-1/2 YEARS, AND IN MANY PLACES THE FREQUENCY OF TURNOVER IS EVEN GREATER. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS HAD THREE DEPUTY SECRETARIES AND THREE COMPTROLLERS IN THE PAST 4 YEARS. ALL TOO FREQUENTLY, AGENCY

LEADERS HAVE ONLY BEGUN TO GAIN THE EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO MANAGE THE AGENCY EFFECTIVELY BY THE TIME THEY MOVE ON TO NEW RESPONSIBILITIES OR LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT.

ALSO, IN RECENT YEARS THE PROBLEM OF INSTABILITY AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF OUR AGENCIES HAS BEEN MAGNIFIED BY INSTABILITY IN THE SENIOR LEVELS OF THE CAREER SERVICE. ONE OF THE HOPES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT WAS THAT A CORPS OF PROFESSIONAL, CAREER EXECUTIVES COULD SUPPLY SOME OF THE MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE AND STABILITY NEEDED IN THE AGENCIES. BUT THE ATTRITION AMONG SESs CLEARLY SHOWS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET ACCOMPLISHED THAT OBJECTIVE. OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVES WHO JOINED THE SES WHEN IT WAS CREATED IN 1979, ABOUT 40 PERCENT HAD LEFT THE GOVERNMENT BY 1984.

I BELIEVE ONE OF OUR HIGHEST MANAGERIAL PRIORITIES MUST BE TO DEVELOP NEW WAYS OF BUILDING STABILITY INTO THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR MAJOR OPERATING AGENCIES. IN SOME CASES, THE BRITISH MODEL OF SENIOR CAREER CIVIL SERVANTS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF AN AGENCY MAY BE APPROPRIATE. IN OTHERS, IT MAY PROVE DESIRABLE TO ESTABLISH CERTAIN KEY POSITIONS AS TENURED, WITH STRONG PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED OF ANY PROSPECTIVE APPOINTEE.

THIS LEADS US TO ANOTHER PROBLEM--THAT OF RECRUITING, DEVELOPING, AND RETAINING COMPETENT STAFF AT ALL LEVELS OF AN ORGANIZATION, NOT JUST AMONG ITS EXECUTIVES.

RECRUITING, DEVELOPING AND RETAINING COMPETENT CAREER STAFF.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, ANY AGENCY, REGARDLESS OF ITS MISSION, NEEDS EXCELLENCE UP AND DOWN THE LINE IN ITS CAREER STAFF. NO ONE KNOWS THIS MORE THAN I. MY SUCCESS AS COMPTROLLER GENERAL DEPENDS ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 5,000 PEOPLE WHO WORK IN THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.

AS MANAGERS, WE LOOK TO OUR PERSONNEL SYSTEMS TO HELP US ACHIEVE THE EXCELLENCE WE NEED. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR PERSONNEL SYSTEMS DON'T ALWAYS YIELD THAT EXCELLENCE. IN THE WORDS OF THE NAPA PANEL, "THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM DOESN'T SEEM TO WORK VERY WELL FOR ANYBODY."

SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED TO ASSURE RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION ON THE BASIS OF MERIT HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO FAIL IN PRACTICE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY OFTEN BURDEN THE MANAGER WHO REALLY DOES WANT TO ACHIEVE EXCELLENCE IN HIS OR HER STAFF AND IS FRUSTRATED IN THAT EFFORT BY THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS RED-TAPE CREATED BY THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM.

I AM CONVINCED THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE TO BE THIS WAY. GAO, FOR EXAMPLE, IS DEVELOPING ITS OWN PERSONNEL SYSTEM. THE AUTHORITY TO DO SO WAS GRANTED BY THE CONGRESS ONLY 4 YEARS AGO, AND WE ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING IT. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO BUILD A SYSTEM WHICH IS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ASSURE THAT ONE, THE AGENCY CAN BE MANAGED EFFICIENTLY; TWO, ALL MEMBERS OF OUR STAFF ARE TREATED FAIRLY; AND THREE, ALL PERSONNEL DECISIONS ARE MADE ON THE BASIS OF DEMONSTRATED MERIT IN CARRYING OUT THE WORK OF THE OFFICE. THOSE REQUIREMENTS ARE NEVER EASY TO RECONCILE, BUT IT CAN BE DONE, AND WE ARE COMMITTED TO DOING IT.

LACK OF RELIABLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.

THE MOST SKILLED MANAGERS, HOWEVER, ARE HELPLESS WITHOUT RELIABLE INFORMATION. BUT ALL TOO OFTEN FEDERAL AGENCY MANAGERS FIND THEMSELVES IN THE SITUATION OF NOT KNOWING WHAT IS GOING ON IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS. AGENCY GOALS, MISSIONS, AND OBJECTIVES ARE AMBIGUOUS; PROGRAM PRIORITIES ARE UNCLEAR; FINANCIAL DATA IS EITHER IRRELEVANT OR TOO UNTIMELY TO BE USEFUL; AND THE MOST BASIC DATA ON PROGRAM OUTPUTS IS MISSING.

IN ADDITION, MANAGERS OFTEN FIND THEMSELVES IN A SITUATION WHERE THEY CAN'T PREDICT WITH ANY CONFIDENCE THE FUNDING LEVELS

FOR THEIR OPERATIONS FROM ONE MONTH TO THE NEXT. WE ARE CLEARLY IN A PERIOD OF SEVERELY CONSTRAINED RESOURCES, AND BUDGETARY INSTABILITY MAKES THE PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT EVEN WORSE. THIS INSTABILITY MAKES A MOCKERY OF ANY TALK ABOUT SERIOUS PLANNING AND REDUCES THE MANAGER TO A STRATEGY OF COPING, RATHER THAN MANAGING. IN SOME WAYS IT IS A TRIBUTE TO THESE MANAGERS, BOTH CAREER AND POLITICAL, THAT THEY COPE AS WELL AS THEY DO IN THIS ENVIRONMENT.

BUT, IF WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK, COPING IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST MAKE SURE THAT OUR MANAGERS KNOW WHAT THEY ARE EXPECTED TO DO AND THAT THEY HAVE THE TOOLS THEY NEED TO DO IT. THIS MEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT AGENCY OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES MUST BE DEFINED MORE CLEARLY. BUDGETARY RESOURCES MUST BE RELATED SYSTEMATICALLY--AND MOST OF ALL, PREDICTABLY--TO THOSE PRIORITIES. AND WE MUST DEVELOP INFORMATION SYSTEMS WHICH WILL PERMIT MANAGERS TO HOLD THEIR SUBORDINATES ACCOUNTABLE AND TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE THEMSELVES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGENCY OBJECTIVES.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN THE PROBLEM OF MANAGERIAL INSTABILITY AND UNRELIABLE INFORMATION

SYSTEMS. RELIABLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS CANNOT BE CREATED OVERNIGHT. THEY TAKE TIME, MONEY, HARD WORK AND COMMITMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, AGENCY LEADERS WHO WILL BE IN OFFICE ONLY BRIEFLY HAVE AN UNDERSTANDABLE RELUCTANCE TO INVEST THEIR TIME, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES IN DEVELOPING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT ONLY THEIR SUCCESSORS.

THE EXPERIENCES OF MANY OF OUR STATES AND LARGE CITIES DEMONSTRATE THAT RELIABLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS CAN BE DEVELOPED AND INSTALLED. IN NEW YORK CITY, IT TOOK A FINANCIAL CRISIS TO STIMULATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE, INTEGRATED BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM--ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF RELIABLE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION. PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE, OTHER STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE THE SAME IN HOPES OF PREVENTING CRISES OF THEIR OWN. IN MY JUDGMENT, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--FACING PROBLEMS TYPIFIED BY BUDGET DEFICITS OF \$200 BILLION OR MORE--CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO PUT OFF BUILDING THE SYSTEMS IT NEEDS.

CONCLUSION

THESE ARE ONLY SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH LARGE AGENCIES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL MUST ATTACK IS THEY ARE TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINED

IMPROVEMENTS IN MANAGEMENT. I SUSPECT THAT THESE SAME PROBLEMS ARE FOUND IN MANY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES AS WELL.

IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE EXCELLENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF OUR AGENCIES, WE MUST FIND WAYS OF FREEING OUR ABLE MANAGERS AND EXECUTIVES TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THEIR AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS. WE MUST DEMAND EXCELLENCE FROM OUR MANAGERS AND WE MUST FIND WAYS OF EFFECTIVELY HOLDING THEM ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE RESULTS THEY ACHIEVE. AND WE MUST REMEMBER TO RECOGNIZE AND REWARD THAT EXCELLENCE WHEN IT APPEARS, AS IT SURELY WILL.