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Report to Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

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GAO has issued several reports since 1970 on U.S. involvement in the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has made recommendations to the Secretary of State with which he has agreed, but has done nothing about. The ILO, established in 1919 to set standards which improve working conditions, generate employment, and promote human rights, is a tripartite organization, whose U.S. delegation is selected by the Department of Commerce and the AFL-CIO. Findings/Conclusions: U.S. relations with the ILO have deteriorated to such an extent that in November 1975, the United States gave notice that it intends to withdraw unless ILO can resolve its problems. The Departments of Commerce, Labor, and State have objectives for U.S. participation, but there is little coordination of these objectives. U.S. agencies have taken steps to improve participation only since the notice of intent to withdraw. The Labor Department has begun to attempt to obtain additional budget data, has increased analysis staff, and has recognized the need for effective evaluation of ILO projects. The Labor Department steps should be coordinated with the other concerned agencies and groups. A statement of long-term objectives of the agencies would help them formulate a recommendation to the President as to whether or not to withdraw. Recommendations: Overall objectives for U.S. participation should be developed and coordinated among the interested groups, especially employer and worker groups. A strategy for achieving the objectives should be developed, and a high level of interest should be encouraged so that recent U.S. initiative could be further developed. (Author/SS)

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**REPORT TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS**



**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

**Need For U.S. Objectives
In The International
Labor Organization**

Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce

This report (1) discusses the U.S. notice of intent to withdraw from the International Labor Organization, (2) questions the U.S. Government's commitment to effective participation, (3) analyzes the constraints to members influencing the Organization's budget, (4) points out the need to improve evaluation of its programs, and (5) recommends the development, coordination, and implementation of overall objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization.



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-168767

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff
Chairman, Committee on Governmental
Affairs
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is our report on the International Labor Organization in response to your request of July 30, 1976. Your request advised us of the Committee's examination of United States involvement in international organizations and asked that our previous work in this area be updated.

We share your concern that U.S. participation in international organizations receive adequate priority within the U.S. Government. U.S. participation in the International Labor Organization has been one of crisis management alternated with periods of low interest levels. Thus, if the United States does remain a member of the Organization, U.S. participation easily could revert to the low levels of interest demonstrated in the past. This report centers on the U.S. notice of intent to withdraw from the Organization.

In order to expedite the report, we did not follow our usual practice of obtaining written comments on the draft report from the agencies affected. We did, however, discuss the draft report with key officials of those agencies and considered their views in finalizing the report.

This report contains several recommendations to the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce concerning objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations within 60 days and to the House and Senate Committee on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriation made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

B-168767

As agreed with your Office, we plan to distribute this report to the agencies involved and other appropriate congressional committees.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Thomas A. Steeds". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "T".

Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

NEED FOR U.S. OBJECTIVES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION
Departments of State,
Labcr, and Commerce

D I G E S T

In its report on the International Labor Organization, in 1970, GAO told the Congress that the United States lacks definitive and measurable objectives for participation in the Organization and recommended to the Secretary of State that the Government develop such objectives and a plan for achieving them.

GAO also recommended to the Secretary that the Government obtain better budget, program, and operational data; and make more effective analyses and evaluations of the Organization's projects and programs.

The Department of State generally agreed with these recommendations. GAO repeated these recommendations in a follow-up report issued in 1974. The Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked GAO to update its previous reviews of U.S. participation in the International Labor Organization and other international organizations. On the basis of this review GAO concludes that, despite the agreements by State, there has been virtually no action based on GAO's recommendations after 7 years.

In the 2-year period 1976-77, the U.S. contribution to the Organization budget was \$40.1 million of its total of \$160.6 million. U.S. contributions for calendar years 1946-1977 will total \$157.6 million, with more than half of this amount assessed since calendar year 1971.

GAO reported in 1970 that U.S. policy objectives relating to both political and technical assistance considerations were defined broadly and were not measurable. U.S. relations with the Organization have deteriorated to such an extent since then that in November 1975 the United States gave notice that it intends to

withdraw from the Organization unless its problems can be resolved. At the same time the United States promised to give high priority to promoting conditions which will facilitate its continued participation.

Today, more than 1 year into a 2-year waiting period before withdrawal becomes final, and having stated the United States will do all it can to resolve its problems with the Organization, the Federal agencies responsible for U.S. participation have not developed an overall statement of U.S. objectives for the Organization.

The Organization was established in 1919 to set standards which improve working conditions, generate employment, and promote human rights. In recent years, it has undertaken a program of technical assistance to developing countries.

The International Labor Organization is a tripartite organization. That is, each member sends a delegation representing government, employers, and workers of that country. The U.S. employer and worker representatives are chosen by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO. The Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce share responsibility for U.S. Government participation. (See ch. 1.)

Each of the three agencies has, in varying degrees, objectives for this participation reflecting that agency's interest. They developed their objectives largely independently. Generally, there has been no consultation among these agencies, the U.S. Mission in Geneva, or with employer and worker groups.

The three Federal agencies should continue to formulate their own objectives in pursuing their interests with the Organization, but there should be coordination among them to make sure that agencies' objectives are in harmony with overall U.S. objectives. To attain maximum benefit from U.S. participation in the Organization, objectives should be coordinated by the three agencies, with the U.S. Mission, and with employer and worker representatives. (See ch. 3.)

U.S. participation in the Organization has been one of crisis management alternated with periods of low interest levels. As each crisis with the Organization subsided, U.S. attention subsided. Thus, if the United States does remain a member, U.S. participation easily could revert to the low levels of interest demonstrated in the past. (See ch. 2.)

U.S. agencies have taken steps to improve U.S. participation in the Organization only since the notice of intent to withdraw. However, no long-term commitment has been demonstrated. (See ch. 4.)

In its report of 1970, GAO found U.S. officials did not have sufficient information on the Organization's programs and recommended they obtain from it more complete and informative budget and program proposals and make a thorough analysis of the data. However, the Organization's planning and budgeting documents today are still too general to permit meaningful analysis. The Labor Department has begun to take some steps to obtain information in addition to that contained in the budget documents and has increased the staff in the section responsible for the analysis. These initiatives are being implemented and could prove effective. (See ch. 5.)

GAO also recommended in 1970 that the U.S. agencies make more effective evaluations of the Organization's projects. However, they have shown little initiative in this regard. Basically, their efforts have been limited to the preparation of position papers on Organization meeting agenda items. The Labor Department recognizes this need for more effective evaluation and plans to improve its evaluation capability. (See ch. 6.)

GAO believes that the above initiatives by the Department of Labor are important initial steps and that, as in the case of the preparation of objectives, efforts be coordinated with the Departments of State and Commerce as well as with the employer and worker groups.

The U.S. agencies should clearly state their

long-term objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization. Such a statement will enable the agencies to help formulate a recommendation to the President whether or not to withdraw from the Organization, because the decision will be based, in part, on what the United States will gain by continuing its membership.

GAO therefore recommends that before November 1977, the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce:

- Develop overall objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization.
- Coordinate these objectives with other interested groups, namely, the employer and worker representatives.
- Develop a strategy for achieving the objectives, making sure that, if the United States remains a member, it maintains a high level of interest so that recent initiatives by U.S. agencies can be further developed and carried out.

Although GAO did not follow its usual procedure of obtaining formal agency comments, the draft report was discussed with key officials of the agencies concerned. These officials stated they believe that the development and implementation of program objectives would give the impression that the United States had decided to remain in the Organization. The basic objective of U.S. agencies in the short term is to reverse the trend toward politicization of the Organization. GAO believes that the continued lack of long-range U.S. program objectives raises questions about the seriousness of the U.S. stated commitment to improve the quality of U.S. participation.

Agencies officials agreed with GAO's conclusion that without continued high-level U.S. interest, U.S. participation would deteriorate.

C o n t e n t s

		<u>Page</u>
DIGEST		1
CHAPTER		
1	ORGANIZATION OF AND U.S. REPRESENTATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION	1
	Description of the ILO	2
	ILO budget and U.S. contributions	2
	U.S. representation to the ILO	5
	Scope of review	5
2	U.S. INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ILO	7
	Long-term dissatisfaction	7
	Study of U.S. participation	8
	Effect of withdrawal notice-- cautious optimism	9
	Conclusion	11
3	U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES NOT CLEARLY DEVELOPED	12
	ILO priorities	12
	State Department objectives are political	12
	Labor Department objectives are being redefined	13
	Commerce objectives are not specific	15
	U.S. Mission is not aware of agency objectives	16
	Conclusion	17
4	U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ILO	18
	Coordinating committee established	18
	State Department's commitment is uncertain	19
	Labor Department's new initiatives	21
	Commerce's role is limited	22
	ILO meetings and conferences	23
	Conclusion	24
5	ILO PLAN, PROGRAM AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS ON ANALYSIS	25
	Planning and budgeting process	25
	Constraints on member influence	28
	Conclusion	30

	<u>Page</u>	
CHAPTER		
6	EVALUATION OF ILO PROGRAMS STILL INADEQUATE	31
	ILO, U.N. evaluation efforts--	31
	some progress noted	34
	U.S. evaluation efforts are limited	36
	Conclusion	36
7	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	38
	Conclusions	38
	Recommendations	39
	Agencies comments	40
APPENDIX		
I	Letter dated July 30, 1976, from the Senate Committee on Government Operations	41
II	U.S. Delegation to the 61st Session of the International Labor Conference, June 1976	42
III	Notice of U.S. intent to withdraw from the International Labor Organization dated November 5, 1975	48
IV	Officials primarily responsible for managing U.S. participation in the International Labor Organization	53

ABBREVIATIONS

AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
GAO	General Accounting Office
ILO	International Labor Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION OF AND U.S. REPRESENTATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The United States has been involved with the International Labor Organization (ILO) since its founding in 1919 in Washington, D.C., and became a member of the Organization in 1934. The Secretary of State said in 1975 that "American relations with the ILO are older, and perhaps deeper, than with any other international organization." In July 1976, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (formerly the Committee on Government Operations) asked us to update our two previous reviews ^{1/} of U.S. participation in ILO and other organizations. (See app. I.)

The ILO is the oldest of the major specialized agencies in the United Nations. It is unique in that it has a tripartite structure. Delegations of member nations must include nongovernmental and governmental representation, that is, employers and workers as well as government spokesmen. In theory, at least, the employer and worker delegates are not controlled by their government and can vote independently. Both employers and workers must be represented before either can vote.

This tripartite structure, while contributing to ILO's durability and usefulness, has also been the underlying factor in the majority of frictions within the Organization. U.S. officials believe that the basic question of tripartism is complicated by universality, the inclusion of all governmental systems. It is almost impossible to have truly tripartite delegations to the ILO, which has universality of membership. This is most apparent in monolithic governmental structures, such as the Soviet Union. It is also a problem with other nations. For example, some of the less developed countries have not yet settled on forms of government. The erosion of tripartite representation has led to increasing concern regarding U.S. participation in the ILO.

^{1/} "U.S. Participation in the International Labor Organization Not Effectively Managed," Dec. 22, 1970, B-168767, and "Numerous Improvements Still Needed in Managing U.S. Participation in International Organizations," July 18, 1974, B-168767.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ILO

The Organization was established to set international labor standards which improve working conditions, generate employment, and promote human rights. In recent years, it has also undertaken a program of technical assistance to developing countries.

As shown in the following diagram, the ILO is composed of the International Labor Conference, the Governing Body, and the International Labor Office (Secretariat). The International Labor Conference meets annually and drafts and adopts international standards, in the form of conventions or recommendations. When ratified, conventions have the force of international treaties. The recommendations are guidelines to recommended courses of action and are not subject to ratification. The Conference also approves the ILO program and budget and elects members to serve on the Governing Body.

The Governing Body acts as a board of directors, elects the Director General and gives him instructions and guidance, and provides general supervision of the International Labor Office. The governing body comprises of 56 members--28 representing governments, 14 representing employees, and 14 representing workers. Of the 28 governments, 10 are of "Chief Industrial Importance," including the United States which has a nonelective seat. The remaining 18 are elected for 3-year terms at the annual conference.

The International Labor Office has a total staff of 3,200 which is divided about evenly between its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and the field offices.

ILO BUDGET AND U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

Programs in the ILO regular budget are totally financed by member contributions. Other programs are funded from moneys received from other organizations, the major one being the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which are not included in the regular budget. A comparison of the last four biennium budgets and U.S. contributions is shown on the following page.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>U.S. contribution</u>
	----- (millions) -----	
1970-71	\$ 59.7	\$ 14.9
1972-73	69.7	17.4
1974-75	93.6	22.6
1976-77	<u>a/160.6</u>	40.1

a/Includes a \$16.6 million supplement approved in 1976. The original budget adopted in June 1975, was for \$144 million.

ILO officials told us the large increase between the last two budgets was mainly due to the (1) effect of inflation, (2) currency fluctuations of the Swiss franc in relation to the dollar, and (3) cost of occupying the new building.

In 1976 there were 134 member states and each member's contribution was at least 0.03 percent of the total annual regular budget. The United States contributes at the maximum rate of 25 percent. 1/ Although the U.S. contribution rate has remained constant since 1970, other contributors' rankings and rates have changed, as shown below for the 10 largest contributors.

	Assessment		Ranking
	Percent 1976	Percent 1970	
United States	25.00	25.00	1
Soviet Union (note a)	12.11	10.00	2
Germany	6.73	4.96	5
Japan	6.25	2.64	8
France	6.07	6.07	4
United Kingdom	5.82	9.14	3
Peoples Republic of China (note b)	4.84	2.80	7
Italy	3.43	2.35	10
Canada	3.36	3.36	6
Ukraine	1.69	1.35	<u>c/13</u>


a/Byelorussia and the Ukraine, 2 of 16 republics which make up the Soviet Union, are themselves dues paying members of the ILO. The combined assessment for the Soviet Union and the two republics was 14.27 percent of the regular ILO budget in 1976.

b/The Peoples Republic of China has never paid its assessed dues.

c/The Ukraine ranked 13th in 1970, and India ranked 9th; India dropped to 13th place in 1976.

1/Public Law 92-544 limits U.S. contributions to 25 percent.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION



U.S. REPRESENTATION TO THE ILO

U.S. Government delegates to the International Labor Conference are appointed by the Secretary of State. The two delegates are the Special Assistant for International Labor Affairs to the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant for ILO Affairs to the Secretary of Labor. The latter delegate is also appointed by the President as the U.S. representative to the Governing Body. An alternate delegate is from the Department of Commerce.

Employer and worker delegates to the Governing Body and the Conference are also appointed by the Secretary of State but are chosen for appointment by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). At the time of our review, the employer delegate was the Chairman of the Board of SIFCO Industries, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio. The worker delegate was the International Representative of the AFL-CIO. There has been a complete turnover in U.S. delegates to the annual ILO conference since our 1970 report.

Delegates are assisted by advisors selected by the Secretary of State, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the AFL-CIO, respectively. (App. II lists the U.S. delegation to the June 1976 International Labor Conference.) Further assistance to delegates is provided by the Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, and staffs of U.S. agencies.

The Department of State has responsibility for the political aspects of the ILO and also reviews the ILO budget because the U.S. contribution is financed from its appropriation.

The Department of Labor and, to a lesser extent, the Department of Commerce have responsibility for the technical aspects of ILO affairs. The U.S. Mission in Geneva has a full-time Labor Attache for ILO affairs who provides the day-to-day contact with the Organization.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review was made at the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland. We talked with representatives of the U.S. Government, as well as with the employer and worker delegates to the International Labor Conference and with officials at the AFL-CIO

and the Chamber of Commerce. The U.S. Mission in Geneva also arranged for us to meet with a number of ILO officials. We also visited a developing country receiving ILO technical assistance.

Our work was directed primarily at the manner in which these agencies responsible for U.S. Government participation in ILO were carrying out their responsibilities. We did not evaluate the manner in which ILO carries out its activities although we did study its planning, budgeting, and evaluation processes as they related to member country participation.

CHAPTER 2

U.S. INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ILO

On November 5, 1975, the Secretary of State notified the ILO Director General of the U.S. intention to withdraw from the ILO. (See app. III.) The notification was agreed to by both Government and non-Government participants. The United States maintained that it does not desire to leave the ILO and does not expect to do so, but intends "to make every possible effort to promote the conditions which will facilitate our continued participation." However, failing this, the United States is, in fact, prepared to depart.

LONG-TERM DISSATISFACTION

The idea of the United States leaving the ILO is not new; however, the latest serious consideration of withdrawal began after the June 1975 International Labor Conference. According to U.S. officials, dissatisfaction with ILO had been increasing since the early 1950s, when the Soviet Union rejoined. The officials believe that Communist and some other members, lacking a truly tripartite representation, skewed ILO activity toward government domination, and that the Organization has become a forum for political confrontation.

At the June 1975 Conference, the Palestine Liberation Organization was granted observer status. This prompted a walkout by the U.S. delegation, although Government and employer delegates subsequently returned and participated in the Conference. U.S. officials we talked to said the Palestine Liberation Organization issue is commonly looked upon as the last straw but is actually only the tip of the iceberg. The U.S. withdrawal is based more broadly on the belief that ILO has drifted away from its original purposes and is increasingly unable to deal objectively with issues basic to its charter. An informal U.S. Government study concluded that serious, longstanding problems in the ILO are primarily political and have diverted the ILO from its basic objectives, principles, and methods of operation. The ILO Conference and, to a lesser but increasing extent, the Governing Body, have also been diverted from substantive work.

Despite the emphasis in the U.S. withdrawal notice on the increasing politicization of the ILO, it is important to note that the ILO has always been a very political

organization. We understand that one of the unstated reasons for establishing the ILO was to combat radicalism in labor unions. Today, the United States is criticizing the increasing number of unfriendly political actions being taken by the ILO.

Some U.S. officials believe that U.S. participation in ILO has been given such a low priority that the situation simply cannot continue. The Congress withheld the U.S. contribution in 1970 when a Russian was appointed Assistant Director-General. This had some shock effect in 1970 and resulted in some short-term improvements. On the recommendation of the AFL-CIO, the Congress again withheld the U.S. contribution in 1975 when the Palestine Liberation Organization was granted observer status at the annual Conference. However, it was thought the tactic would not be effective a second time.

STUDY OF U.S. PARTICIPATION

After the 1975 annual Conference, the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce undertook an informal study of U.S. participation in the ILO to identify U.S. interests, trends in the ILO, issues involved with remaining in or withdrawing from the ILO, and alternative courses of action in either event. The draft study, which was never formally approved, was to serve as a basis for tentatively deciding whether the United States should serve notice of intention to withdraw from the ILO. It was to be followed by a fuller study in cooperation with the workers and employers through the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce with regard to continued U.S. participation. The draft study noted that ILO political problems in the past had reflected primarily East-West conflicts, but that North-South (developed vs. developing world) issues had also recently become politicized. Seven problem areas were listed in the draft study.

1. The increasing politicization of ILO.
2. The double standard in the application of ILO conventions.
3. Disregard of ILO rules and due process procedures.
4. Efforts to radically change the structure of and power relationships within ILO.
5. Toleration of irrelevant political attacks on members in the Conference.

6. The growing tendency to inject U.N. political resolutions into the deliberations of ILO.
7. The weakness of Western European and other Western-oriented member states on East-West issues.

The draft study recommended that a notice of intent to withdraw be issued. This was also the position of the worker and employer groups. The letter of intent to withdraw, issued in November 1975, thus had full U.S. tripartite support.

It presented four matters of fundamental concern to the United States--(1) the erosion of tripartite representation, (2) selective concern for human rights, (3) disregard of due process, and (4) the increasing politicization of ILO. Basically, these covered the same problem areas identified in the U.S. Government draft study.

We were told that reaction to the letter ranged from belief that the United States had irrevocably decided to leave ILO and there was nothing anyone could do, to the belief that this was just part of a diplomatic game, and the United States wasn't really serious about withdrawing. The misinterpretation of the actual intent was of great concern to United States officials. Success in resolving U.S. problems with ILO was viewed as depending in large measure on the cooperation of other members. In January 1976, the President appointed a personal representative to undertake a special mission to capitals of major industrial nations. He was to convey the message that the United States was serious about trying to correct the problems but that it would indeed withdraw if this failed.

EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL NOTICE-- CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM

Many officials with whom we talked believe that, as promised in the withdrawal notice, the United States has put forth greater effort in working with ILO. The three Government agencies most concerned with ILO matters--State, Labor, and Commerce--have taken steps to improve their respective participation. Also, the President established a cabinet-level committee in November 1975 to coordinate the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward ILO.

Various officials we talked with expressed the belief that, in a sense, implicit in the tripartite agreement to

give notice of intent to withdraw from the ILO was that the United States must also get its house in order. The 1975 draft study acknowledged that this country had not been exerting much effort in ILO matters and must share responsibility for the drift in the Organization.

Our review also shows that U.S. participation has been one of crisis management alternated with periods of neglect. Generally, the improved U.S. participation since the withdrawal letter was submitted is due to the appearance of a high-level interest and commitment. However, the durability of this interest and, thus, the effectiveness of these improvements have not yet been proven.

During 1976, the United States has worked toward developing a consultation process with like-minded ILO members, and U.S. officials are encouraged by the results. There have been consultations between these members prior to ILO meetings at which positions have been discussed and areas of agreement identified. This process has resulted in these members standing together on ILO issues of common interests to a remarkable extent--a solidarity perhaps not possible without the submission of the U.S. notice of intent to withdraw.

Encouraged by the results of visits to European and other capitals in early 1976 the cabinet-level committee recommended the visits be extended to other members. Late in 1976, a U.S. Government delegate to the Governing Body visited several Asian member nations in an effort to identify areas of common interest. A similar visit to African capitals was completed in January 1977 and one to Latin America is planned for later in the year.

No Communist member was elected president of a major ILO conference during 1976--an important part of U.S. concern about the erosion of tripartism. To the United States, such an election would be accepting a representative in a leading role from a country where the workers' and employers' groups are under the domination of governments. This domination is inconsistent with ILO principles.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was granted observer status at the World Employment Conference. However, disruptive political matters played a lesser part in 1976 ILO meetings, partly because of such unusual circumstances as the World Employment Conference meeting con-

currently with the annual Conference and an agreement not to introduce new resolutions at the annual Conference.

Some officials we talked with noted a possible new responsiveness by the Secretariat to U.S. interests, thus somewhat balancing the influence of pressure groups that had come to dominate ILO proceedings. The ILO Secretariat has been receptive both to U.S. efforts to learn more about the programing process and specific U.S. program interests and has decided to adopt the Agency for International Development's project evaluation system. (See ch. 6.)

U.S. officials stress that a final decision on U.S. withdrawal, which will depend in part on where ILO is headed, will probably not be made until the end of the 2-year waiting period in November 1977. The letter of intent to withdraw was a tripartite effort, and the final decision to act must be agreed on by government, worker, and employer groups. Officials pointed out that there is no list of items which ILO must agree to and that any such specification would signal whether the United States will actually pull out, thus negating any leverage that the notice has provided.

Most of the people we talked to expressed optimism over the developments that have taken place but cautioned that some things may have been motivated by a desire to placate the United States. They are well aware that, if the United States decides to remain, things could rapidly deteriorate to the conditions of 1975.

CONCLUSION

The executive branch made studies of U.S. participation in ILO in 1956 and 1971. The third, and most recent, an informal study made prior to issuing the letter of intent to withdraw, noted:

"If it is decided to continue U.S. participation, a greater commitment to supporting that decision will be necessary to avoid a fourth repetition of this exercise." (i.e., a fourth study of U.S. participation in and possible withdrawal from the ILO.)

We believe the United States must also evaluate its own participation and make a judgment as to whether it is finally committed to a serious and continuing effort in ILO.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES NOT CLEARLY DEVELOPED

We reported in 1970 that U.S. political and developmental assistance policy objectives for ILO were broadly defined and difficult to measure. We recommended that the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce frame definitive and measurable objectives and develop and implement a firm policy and a workable plan for achieving such objectives.

Since then, U.S. relations with ILO have deteriorated to such an extent that the United States in 1975 gave notice that it intends to withdraw from the organization unless certain problems can be resolved. Today, less than a year before U.S. withdrawal becomes final, no overall statement of U.S. objectives for ILO has been developed.

ILO PRIORITIES

The ILO has stated that its ultimate goal is to give effective service to all its members both large and small. Its aim is to constantly improve the lot and enhance the dignity of workers everywhere.

Accordingly, it has concentrated its main emphasis on five major themes:

1. Mass poverty, employment, and training.
2. Working conditions and environment.
3. Tripartism, industrial relations, and participation.
4. Planning, performance, and evaluation of social security.
5. Fundamental human rights.

STATE DEPARTMENT OBJECTIVES ARE POLITICAL

State officials told us that the Department's objective for ILO is to work toward alleviating the conditions noted in the U.S. letter of intent to withdraw--the erosion of tripartism, selective concern for human rights, disregard for due process, and increasing politicization of ILO.

In a sense, State's objectives are short term and are tied to November 1977, when the United States must decide whether to actually withdraw from ILO. Officials point out, however, that even if sufficient improvements take place in the four areas of the withdrawal letter and the United States remains a member, these areas of concern will never completely disappear. That is, these political considerations will always be an element in ILO. Indeed, a 1975 U.S. Government draft study concluded that U.S. interests in ILO have been and remain primarily in the areas of foreign policy and politics.

From our discussions with various officials, it appeared that the link between State's ILO role and U.S. foreign policy is a matter of some question. The employer representative told us his impression was that a basic tenet of U.S. foreign policy was to work out international problems through U.N. specialized agencies and thereby, through U.S. participation in ILO. He has unsuccessfully sought to find more specific objectives and observed that past U.S. participation in ILO meetings has been passive and hardly consistent with trying to influence ILO objectives.

A worker representative said he assumes that U.S. participation in ILO has some overall foreign policy objective but that no one he has talked with at State has been able to identify it. He said ILO has always been treated as a "stepchild" at State, never really fitting into all that State does, and that ILO matters are handled in a routine fashion.

LABOR DEPARTMENT OBJECTIVES ARE BEING REDEFINED

We reviewed several documents at the Department of Labor which stated objectives for ILO. In October 1975, at about the time the United States decided to submit the letter of intent to withdraw, the Labor Department drafted the following ILO objectives: (1) establish criteria and goals for continued U.S. participation, correct the conditions which prompted the letter, and improve U.S. effectiveness and (2) advise the President on whether to withdraw toward the end of the 2-year period.

Six months later, in May 1976, Labor prepared an issue paper titled "U.S. Relations with the International Labor Organization." The paper presented some basic objectives for the period until November 1977.

1. Strengthen ties with other industrial ILO members.
2. Establish a new relationship with the developing countries.
3. Seek ways to get more direct benefit from U.S. participation in ILO.

The most recent Labor Department's basic objectives, dated August 1976, are more forward looking than the previous two statements.

"To improve the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the ILO through efforts designed to (1) better prepare members of U.S. delegations, and (2) exert greater influence over the technical content of ILO programs to make them more effective and, in particular, more responsive to U.S. needs."

These basic objectives, if achieved, would appear to set the stage for improved U.S. participation in ILO. They include such things as (1) developing detailed program proposals in cooperation with similar-thinking members for presentation to the Governing Body session considering the next ILO budget and (2) providing program suggestions for the ILO medium-term plan during its drafting stage. These things, considered basic to influencing the Organization's program and thus, direction, have not been done with any effectiveness in the past.

The Labor Department believes, however, that the development of new institutional arrangements, including those for the systematic evaluation of ILO programs, must be deferred until a decision is made on the future of U.S. participation in ILO. To do otherwise would jeopardize the credibility of the U.S. letter of intent to withdraw by stimulating speculation that the U.S. has decided to remain in ILO (as evidenced by the establishment of new institutional arrangements for long-term program evaluation). For this reason, Labor has for the most part limited its initiatives for the time being to the development of an evaluation framework which could be made operational if the U.S. remains in ILO.

Labor has also recently identified three broad program priorities which it believes will best serve U.S. interests in ILO and which will seek to influence programs which (1) promote and strengthen democratic institutions in the

labor field, (2) promote jobs and job skills, and (3) foster better work conditions and protection of workers on the job. According to Labor officials, the objectives and milestones had been developed within the Department's Office of Policy and Program Development without consultation with State, Commerce, or employer and worker groups. The priorities document was developed by Labor and circulated to the Departments of State and Commerce upon completion.

It is too soon to determine Labor's progress toward focusing on priorities and achieving its objectives. The last of the staff who will be working in this area were only hired during our review. Officials told us that the Department got too late a start to have any real effect on the 1978-79 biennium budget to be presented to the Governing Body at its February-March 1977 session. It will be next year before ILO updates its medium-term plan for the next 6 years, and Labor can expect to be in a position to exert some influence.

COMMERCE OBJECTIVES ARE NOT SPECIFIC

The Department of Commerce views its role in ILO affairs as an outgrowth of its responsibility to promote international commerce, domestic economic growth, and labor-management stability. Commerce participation was agreed to in 1956 by the Departments of State and Labor.

A 1976 paper prepared by a Commerce Department official recognizes several opportunities participation in ILO affords. Listed among the general opportunities were the promotion of a free enterprise philosophy and the protection of foreign and domestic industry interests of the United States by upgrading worldwide labor standards. However, we were unable to find specific objectives for Commerce participation in ILO. Every 3 months the ILO Affairs coordinator prepares a list of tasks to be performed during the next quarter and reports on the outcome of tasks set for the preceding 3 months. These tasks are reviewed and approved within the Bureau of Domestic Commerce and are not coordinated with other agencies.

We were also told that specific Commerce interests for 1976 were evidenced through its activities at a number of ILO-sponsored conferences dealing with multinational enterprises, maritime affairs, and world employment in addition to its attendance at the regularly scheduled meetings. The fact that the conferences were clearly in Commerce's area of responsibility simplified the task of identifying agency interests for 1976.

Specific objectives for 1977 had not been identified at the time of our review. One official told us that the

Department hoped to be able to advise the President on whether the United States should withdraw from ILO. Another, charged with developing objectives in the past, told us he was having difficulty identifying what the 1977 goals should be. Commerce and other officials we talked to pointed out that no effort was made to identify other possible areas where the Department might play a role. For example, one U.S. Government official pointed out that Commerce has not taken any initiatives in a very important area--promoting our system of a free market economy. One reason for our membership in ILO is the opportunity it provides to show developing countries the advantages of our economic system. Although this role would logically fall to Commerce, it has not moved in this area. A Commerce Department official agreed with the observation but said that such a goal must first be agreed to by State and Labor.

U.S. MISSION IS NOT AWARE
OF AGENCY OBJECTIVES

The U.S. Mission in Geneva, which provides day-to-day contact with international organizations, was not aware of any U.S. agency objectives beyond the political interests listed in the letter of intent to withdraw. The Labor attache, the prime contact with ILO, said he had never been asked to provide data on ILO program activities.

The Mission has not been required to prepare annual policy statements, such as those required of U.S. Embassies and no statement of policy goals has been established for it. The Mission itself prepared a policy statement in the summary of 1976, which stated in the introduction that:

"In the past, there has been no requirement upon the U.S. Mission in Geneva to prepare an annual policy statement such as is required of embassies. This is understandable because of the unusual nature of the Geneva operation. Our semi-generic nature is also reflected in the fact that there has never been an agreed statement of policy goals for Geneva.

"We in the Mission have regretted, however, the absence of an overall evaluation of what we are attempting to achieve, how well we are succeeding, what the obstacles are, and how we could improve our performance in achieving them. We have felt that such an analysis would assist the top management of the Mission to coordinate and improve the diverse activities of the

various sections, and would give the individual officers working in specialized fields a better appreciation of how their activities relate to other parts of the Mission operation and to overall U.S. policy objectives.

"We have also felt that such a statement would assist those in Washington responsible for directing and backstopping our day-to-day activities."

CONCLUSION

Except possibly for objectives associated with U.S. withdrawal, agencies have developed their objectives according to their own interests. The Department of State has short-term political objectives tied to the question of withdrawal from ILO. The Department of Labor developed objectives within the Department for U.S. participation in ILO. We were advised that Commerce's statement of objectives was the work of one staff member and was only approved by the Bureau of Domestic Commerce. There has been little consultation among the agencies, the U.S. Mission, or with employer and worker groups. Neither employer nor employee representatives have been informed what U.S. agencies objectives were beyond the political aims.

Each agency should continue to formulate its own objectives in pursuing ILO interests, but there should be coordination among them to make sure that their objectives are in harmony with overall U.S. objectives. To achieve maximum benefit from U.S. participation in ILO, these objectives should be coordinated among the agencies, with the U.S. Mission, and with employer and worker representatives.

CHAPTER 4

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ILO

Our review has shown that since 1970 the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce have taken steps to improve their effectiveness in carrying out their ILO responsibilities. However, these improvements date from November 1975, when the United States submitted a notice of intent to withdraw from ILO.

It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the changes outlined below; moreover, the agencies have responded to unusual circumstances and their actions have benefited from the high level of attention focused on ILO. The real test of U.S. commitment will come if, at the end of 2 years, the United States decides to remain a member. Various agency officials acknowledged that if the United States does not withdraw and the current high level of attention abates, there is the real possibility that U.S. initiatives may quickly evaporate and the United States will find itself in the same situation that led to the withdrawal notice in the first place.

COORDINATING COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

The cabinet-level committee established by the President in November 1975 is charged with coordinating the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy for ILO.

The Committee is chaired by the Secretary of Labor and attended by Assistant Secretaries of State, Under and Assistant Secretaries of Commerce, and by the Chairman of the National Security Council. President George Meany of the AFL-CIO and Mr. Charles H. Smith, Jr., U.S. Employer Representative to ILO have also attended and participated in decisions.

In December 1975, a working group chaired by the Government representative to ILO, a Labor employee, was established to assist this committee. Meetings of the group are attended by lower level representatives from State, Commerce, and private groups.

The cabinet-level committee and the working group have met several times. However, the working group last met in April 1976 and appears to have fallen into disuse. One member expressed regret at this, saying it had been a useful means of coordination among the agencies and private groups

even apart from its job of assisting the committee. The chairman of the group told us he has been providing the support for the committee but observed that maybe the group should be called upon more often.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMITMENT IS UNCERTAIN

The U.S. contribution to ILO is included in the State Department appropriation. State pursues its foreign policy interests by participating in ILO meetings and conferences, reviewing agenda items, and preparing position papers. It also reviews position papers prepared by other agencies, primarily Labor and Commerce, and provides input for these two areas where appropriate. State provides one of the Government delegates to the ILO conference, who holds the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs.

An Assistant Secretary of State is a member of the cabinet-level committee established to formulate U.S. policy for ILO. Either he or his deputy participates in all sessions of the committee.

In July 1976, a new office of International Labor Organization Affairs, located in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, was established by the Department of State. This office handles day-to-day ILO matters and is to have a major role in formulating, implementing, and coordinating U.S. policy for ILO.

Responsibilities of the Office were formerly handled by the Bureau's Agency Directorate for Labor and Women. In announcing the new office, State said:

"Establishment of a separate office for ILO affairs will enable the Department to respond more effectively to developments in U.S.-ILO relations, and to the increased level of interest in these relations expressed by Labor and Employer and other non-government organizations, by members of Congress and by other groups."

The office was increased from one to two full-time officers. One of them provides Washington backup during the Director's attendance at ILO meetings, thus alleviating what was considered a serious weakness. The office director, citing the importance of continuity in the office,

requested State to fill one position with someone not subject to rotation. However, both positions have been filled by foreign service officers who are subject to rotation.

The United States views developing a dialog with other ILO members as an important part of its ILO efforts during 1976. It initially concentrated on consultations with industrialized western democracies to find areas of common interest and to coordinate positions before ILO meetings. Officials have been encouraged by the progress in this area. We were told these countries have shown a new willingness to speak out for their interests. Officials hope to expand the consultations to developing countries and to establish consultations as part of the responsibility of the U.S. Embassies in the various member countries.

Despite these State Department activities, many people familiar with ILO and U.S. participation over a number of years were skeptical as to whether anything had really changed. Sample comments are paraphrased below. From the workers' group:

- There is a lot of motion in the State Department but I'm not sure it is any more than that.
- ILO always has been a stepchild at State. They treat it in a pro forma fashion.
- State is still not putting out the effort it will take to stay on top of ILO matters.

From the employer group:

- The Washington backup during ILO meetings is weak and inexperienced. This tends to lead to a non-aggressive approach.
- The individual people are committed, but the Department doesn't appear to be committed to its responsibilities.
- U.S. participation is passive.

From Government officials:

- I'm not sure the reorganization (at State) is really any change--except they have one more staff member now.
- They are trying to solve a long-term problem in the short term.

--I'm not sure there is a commitment beyond
November 1977.

LABOR DEPARTMENT'S NEW INITIATIVES

The Department of Labor claims a leadership role in both policy and program matters affecting the ILO. Labor has the prime responsibility for the technical aspects of ILO activities, such as development assistance projects and international labor standards. The Bureau of International Labor Affairs, which coordinates Labor's international activities, carries out these responsibilities.

A Department of Labor official is the U.S. representative for the ILO's Governing Body; the Department also provides the substitute U.S. representative, and one of the two Government delegates to the Annual ILO Conference, who serves as chairman of the U.S. delegation. At the direction of the President, the Secretary of Labor serves as chairman of the cabinet-level committee established to review U.S. participation in ILO after the withdrawal notice was submitted. Additionally, the Department has a role in selecting some delegation members and advisors to ILO meetings.

Labor prepares position papers in its areas of responsibilities, assigns other areas to appropriate agencies, and participates in the interdepartmental clearance of all position papers for meetings of the Governing Body and annual Conference. All position papers are subject to the approval of the Department of State. These papers cover technical labor subjects as well as administration, finance, and budget. Generally, the Department of Labor has responsibility for the former, the Department of State for the latter.

In the fall of 1976, Labor hired additional staff to work with the Coordinator for ILO affairs, which should better enable it to carry out its ILO responsibilities. The new employees have already taken steps in this direction, beginning with an orientation on ILO programing and budgetary process. Labor's ILO Affairs Coordinator was at ILO headquarters for an extensive orientation at the time of our visit there.

Labor Department officials indentified the following three broad priorities which they feel will best serve U.S. interests and will develop and promote ILO programs to fit these priorities.

1. Promote and strengthen democratic institutions in the labor field--covers programs which both define and assess the rights and responsibilities of trade union and employer organizations, promote and facilitate industrial relations, and develop worker, employer, and government institutions.

2. Promote jobs and job skills--covers programs which help to develop both public and private (employer and worker) policies which focus on job creation and programs aimed at developing managerial and job skills.

3. Foster better coordination of work and the protection of workers on-the-job--covers programs relating to job safety, health, and other work conditions.

Generally, the officials we talked with felt that, of the three Government agencies, Labor showed the most promise of long-term improvement in ILO participation. They observed that most activities had been only recently initiated and were the direct result of the current unusual circumstances. Their feelings generally were that it is too soon to judge just how effective the Department will be in the long run.

COMMERCE'S ROLE IS LIMITED

The Department of Commerce's role in ILO affairs has historically been a limited one, involving ILO's efforts to influence the labor and social policies of its member states. For example, as ILO seeks to improve employment conditions, competition between the United States and other countries may become more balanced and as economic development takes place in developing countries, potential new markets are created for U.S. capital goods and technology.

A Commerce official has traditionally served as an alternate Government delegate to the annual conference and the Department is represented at least in an advisory capacity on delegations to other ILO meetings. Both Under and Assistant Secretaries of Commerce have attended meetings of the cabinet-level committee. Commerce has one employee, the ILO affairs coordinator, who devotes full-time to ILO matters. He is assigned to the Legislative Division of the Bureau of Domestic Commerce. As implied by his title, his role is to inform and obtain input from those in the Department with a substantive knowledge of issues being considered by ILO. The Department maintains that approximately 15 people--including

several Under and Assistant Secretaries--have been involved in ILO matters on a part-time basis. Our review has shown that their involvement included attending cabinet-level committee meetings, clearing and in some cases preparing position papers, and participation in special ILO conferences. Several officials have characterized Commerce participation as essentially a one-person operation.

During 1976, we were told, Commerce participation went beyond the usual attendance at regularly scheduled meetings and conferences because three of the special conferences sponsored by ILO during the year concerned multinational enterprises, world employment, and maritime affairs. In addition to Commerce taking the lead in preparing U.S. positions on agenda items and in presenting U.S. positions at the conferences, the Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs headed the U.S. Delegation to the ILO Maritime Conference.

We found Commerce officials were not sure what the Department's involvement will be in 1977 and beyond and recognize the possibility it may revert to the minor role of past years. We were told that ILO initiatives had received pretty much unqualified approval in Commerce during 1976 but that kind of support might not exist under normal circumstances. Other Commerce officials agreed that the Coordinator's position was not high enough to carry any real influence in the Department and under normal circumstances the effectiveness of this position may greatly diminish.

ILO MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES

All three agencies select delegates to ILO meetings according to the type of meeting.

--For the Governing Body, delegations consist of Labor, Commerce, and State Department representatives selected by each agency. Employer and worker members are chosen by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO, respectively.

--For the annual Conference, representatives on the standing committees are independently selected by State, Labor, and Commerce. For technical committees, Labor assigns advisors from the agencies that are the most expert in the subject matter; e.g., Health, Education, and Welfare for paid educational leave;

Labor for labor administration, minimum wage-fixing, etc. Worker and employer representatives are chosen by the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce.

--For the Industrial Committee, delegates are chosen in a manner similar to the annual Conference. Labor assigns the technical activities to the appropriate agencies and they select their delegates. The AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce nominate their own delegates.

--For meetings of experts, where delegates are private individuals rather than representatives of their own governments, the ILO usually requests the Department of Labor to submit the name of a qualified individual; however, in rare cases the ILO Secretariat is aware of an appropriate person and contacts him or her directly.

The International Conferences Office in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the State Department plays a coordinating role in the selection of delegates.

CONCLUSION

U.S. participation in ILO has gained momentum since the United States submitted the notice of intent to withdraw. The United States, consistent with its pledge to do everything it can to solve problems with ILO, should be looking beyond November 1977. Past U.S. participation in ILO has suffered from the lack of a sustained interest and effort on the part of all the agencies involved. Improvements have been temporary. If the United States remains in ILO, a high-level concern within the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce must continue in order to maintain our commitment. We believe that such a commitment has not yet been made and that the improvements we observed in U.S. participation may quickly evaporate if and when circumstances return to normal.

CHAPTER 5

ILO PLAN, PROGRAM AND BUDGET

CONSTRAINTS ON ANALYSIS

Our report of 1970 noted that U.S. officials did not have sufficient information on ILO programs and recommended they obtain more complete and informative budget and program proposals from the Organization. ILO's planning and budgeting documents are today still too general to permit meaningful analysis. However, U.S. officials have taken a different approach to influencing ILO's activities and this approach, if followed through, may prove effective.

The ILO programming and budgeting process centers around the budget, a biennium document, and the medium-term plan, which covers a 6-year period. Both documents are submitted to the ILO Governing Body for debate, and the budget must be approved at the annual Conference.

We found that it is difficult for members to make other than minor alterations in either document. The United States, which in the past has not had much impact on these documents, is going to attempt to have its views reflected in the plan and the budget before they are submitted for debate and approval.

PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESS

The biennial budget and the medium-term plan on which it is based are prepared in consecutive years. The 6-year, medium-term plan is approved in even years; the budget, covering the first 2 years of that plan, is approved the following year. Thus, the 1976-77 budget was approved in 1975. Normally the plan is updated every 2 years, so a plan covering 1978-83 would have been approved in 1976. Currently, ILO is preparing the 1978-79 budget for approval during the June 1977 annual Conference.

The medium-term plan is the starting point of ILO's planning process and contains the broad policies and areas of main emphasis for ILO. The process of updating the medium-term plan is analogous to that of preparing the budget.

1978-79 budgetary process

April 1976--The Director General issued his "program guidance letter" inviting department chiefs to develop their program ideas in light of certain constraints. The medium-term plan was the main criterion by which proposals were to be judged. Under the guidance the budget proposals were to range from a minimum program level of 85 percent of current biennium budget to a maximum of 120 percent of the current level for some departments.

April and May 1976--The departments developed detailed program proposals and submitted them to the Bureau of Program Budgeting and Management. The Bureau analyzed the proposals according to priorities, feasibility, productivity and costs, and relationship to the medium-term plan.

July and August 1976--The three Deputy Directors General held hearings with all the departments. These hearings are closed to persons outside of ILO.

September 1976--The General Committee presented the Director General with a list of budget increases and decreases and he makes the final decisions. An ILO official indicated that after the General Committee review, the proposals are pretty well locked in except for some minor changes. So far the entire process has been internal.

January 1977--Member countries received copies of the proposed document.


February and March 1977--The Director General's proposed budget will be debated at the Governing body meeting in the Planning, Finance, and Administrative Committee. The Bureau of Program Budgeting and Management attends the debates and makes lists of proposed budget cuts and considers their impact. The proposed package is considered by the General Committee with the Director General making the choice of specific cuts. We were told he can pick and choose those cuts consistent with his views--there are always plenty from which to choose. Finally, proposed cuts are reviewed by the Governing Body.

May 1977--Further debate at the session of the Governing Body.

June 1977--At the annual Conference, the budget is voted on by Government representatives only for final

approval. In the past, the Conference actions consisted mainly of determining the overall level of the budget and did not go into the specific cuts proposed by the Director General to meet that level.

The budget process described above is presented graphically in the following chart.



CONSTRAINTS ON MEMBER INFLUENCE

We found that member countries that want to have an effect on ILO planning and budget documents face a difficult task. The budget contains a single set of proposals described only generally without offering any alternatives or options.

The budget proposal does not give a complete picture of ILO activities. ILO is one of the executing agencies for the United Nations Development Program. ILO's regular budget, however, does not show extra-budgetary funds from the UNDP even though it disburses them. A report by the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit showed that, in the 1974-75 biennium, direct annual expenditures for regular budget programs amounted to only \$14.3 million whereas the extrabudgetary funds amounted to about \$44.3 million.

The plan, which is less specific than the budget, is abstract, defines no targets, does not address the question of phasing out low priority programs, and contains no costing information.

Both ILO and U.S. officials agree that analyzing ILO planning and budget documents is difficult. Specifically, the United States has noted that program proposals do not contain clear or precise statements of objectives against which to measure success, and it would like to see the programming system improved by having costs of various program options presented during program reviews. Despite recent progress, they feel further improvements necessary.

ILO officials told us about several improvements in the 1978-79 biennium budget: (1) program narratives would include, wherever possible, specific objectives to be achieved during the biennium, (2) changes in direction or emphasis would be indicated, and (3) extra-budgetary funded programs would be included for the first time. The 1978-79 biennium budget being prepared during our review was characterized by an ILO official as less detailed but more readable.

Effective member analysis of the plan and budget documents is also constrained by the time element. Members do not receive these large and rather complex documents until late December or early January and in less than 60 days members must be prepared for the major debate on them at the February-March Governing Body session. Some further consideration may be given to the budget at the May Governing Body session before it comes before the annual June Conference for final approval--a government-only vote.

An additional timing problem is that when members receive the proposals they are fairly well established. U.S. officials point out, and ILO officials agree that basic changes in direction or programs are no longer practical at this time. ILO staff present the proposals after the Governing Body debate to the Director General for consideration and he recommends specific budget cuts to the Governing Body. ILO officials told us it is not really possible to make substantial changes at that time and the best that members can hope for is minor shifting among programs and a possible reduction in the budget total. In commenting on our draft report, State pointed out that program participation could be improved, but the key to such improvement was additional staff, particularly budget analysts.

Opportunity for member influence

ILO officials told us the opportunity for member countries to influence the medium-term plan and budget proposals occurs during the drafting stage through informal communication with ILO staff. They said the ILO staff tries to discern and consider the views of the major industrial members when drafting program proposals. One official believed that the best way to influence programs would be to select areas of interest, develop positions, and seek the support of other members in advocating the positions. An ILO budget official observed that perhaps ILO should solicit member input for incorporation into program development, perhaps through a questionnaire. However, the problem of trying to satisfy everyone could be viewed as a constraint on this approach.

ILO officials also pointed out that there is a formal mechanism for program input, namely introducing resolutions at various meetings for consideration at the annual Conference. A recent example, still to be acted on, is a proposal to make direct assistance to members a substantial portion of the regular ILO budget; at the time of the proposal the 1976-77 proposed budget allocated 31.6 percent to direct assistance. This proposal represents a departure from the traditional U.S. and United Nations policy of centrally programming and funding development activities by voluntary contributions through the UNDP. While the purpose of the proposal seems worthwhile, we support central programming, funding and the leadership role of the UNDP.

U.S. officials responsible for technical programs have come to much the same conclusion about the best way

to influence ILO planning and budgeting. They intend to make U.S. views known to ILO and reflected in the plan and budget before they are submitted for debate and approval. They have also recently identified areas of greatest interest to the United States and, if the United States remains a member, plan to concentrate their efforts in those areas. The Department of Labor is taking the lead in this activity. However, they were not sufficiently staffed in time to tackle the 1978-79 biennium budget being drafted in 1976. They do expect to play an effective role during 1977 when the medium-term plan update is drafted.

CONCLUSION:

The Department of Labor has initiated actions which could increase consideration of U.S. interests in ILO activities. The initiatives are still being implemented and could prove effective. Labor basically has been working alone in this area, and we believe it should continue to do so. Labor should also coordinate with the Departments of State and Commerce and seek their input as well as that of the employer and worker representatives.

Regarding the recent proposal to fund development assistance from the regular or assessed budget, we believe the U.S. should reassert the U.S. position that all development and technical assistance be channeled through the UNDP and that the proper way to finance such assistance is through voluntary contributions.

CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION OF ILO PROGRAMS

STILL INADEQUATE

In 1970, we recommended that the United States obtain better information from ILO and evaluate the Organization's programs. The United States is still not effectively evaluating ILO programs to ascertain that U.S. monetary contributions to ILO have been used to accomplish intended objectives. Further, ILO officials view the Organization's own evaluation efforts as inadequate.

The U.S. evaluation effort has basically been limited to developing position papers on agenda items for ILO meetings and conferences. This approach is inadequate because it limits evaluation to predetermined areas which are not necessarily of the greatest interest to the United States. Recent initiatives at the Department of Labor should, if followed through, enable a more comprehensive look at ILO program effectiveness.

Recently the ILO decided to adopt the system used by the Agency for International Development to evaluate its technical assistance projects. U.S. officials are encouraged by this development, but it is too early to determine how this decision will be implemented.

ILO, U.N. EVALUATION EFFORTS-- SOME PROGRESS NOTED

We obtained information on what ILO and the United Nations are doing to evaluate ILO activities including recent changes in ILO's internal evaluation capability. Some progress was noted.

External evaluation

The United Nations Joint Inspection Unit serves as an external evaluator for several U.N. specialized agencies, including ILO. The Unit dates back to 1968 and consists of eight inspectors who:

"* * * shall make on-the-spot inquiries and investigations, and when they may themselves decide, in the participating organizations, acting singly or in small groups, they shall have the

broadest powers of investigation in matters having a bearing on efficiency and economy in the rise of the organization's resources."

The Joint Inspection Unit, in determining what reviews will be made each year, asks members for suggestions on areas that need review. The year's review areas are then selected from their suggestions, areas identified by the Unit, and requests made by the specialized agencies.

The only review made solely on ILO by the Joint Inspection Unit was in 1975 on the use of office accommodations at ILO headquarters. Other reports included ILO as one of several organizations reviewed in such areas as medium-term planning, programming, and budgeting. ILO and Unit officials told us the Unit is used mainly for efficiency reviews, such as when ILO asks it in the annual ILO Conference to determine potential economies.

The Joint Inspection Unit recognizes that it is too small to cover all agencies effectively and is shifting its emphasis to reviews of specialized agencies' internal evaluation system. Also, the State Department has noted there is need for greater independence from the Secretariats and further professionalism of evaluation personnel.

There are two other sources of external review. An external auditor conducts an annual financial audit annually of all funds over which the Director General has custody--regular budget, UNDP, trust funds, extra-budgetary accounts, and all other special accounts. The second source is Certified Public Accounting firms, occasionally hired to conduct management reviews in specific areas. For example, one such review was being made of ILO's computer services during our study.

Internal evaluation

In the past, ILO has used a system of what it terms "in-depth reviews" to evaluate its individual programs and activities. These reviews are performed by the ILO Secretariat and submitted to the Program, Financial, and Administrative Committee of ILO's Governing Body.

Five in-depth reviews--decentralization, international labor standards, public information, rural development, and publications and documents--some carried over from 1975, came before the Governing Body in 1976.

Another review covering statistics was in progress during our study. U.S. officials agreed that this system was inadequate because the in-depth studies were evaluations by people of their own programs and thus might lack objectivity. These officials said that these studies are not really evaluations, but rather surveys of what ILO has done in the subject area. The results are used to determine where to put future emphasis.

ILO technical cooperation projects

ILO conducts two general types of field programs, one financed by regular budget resources and one funded by UNDP. "Seed money" is provided for such ILO-funded projects as workers' education and trade union development, because governments are not likely to ask for UNDP funds for these projects. Joint UNDP/ILO projects are generally broader in scope and are conducted in fields consistent with ILO's charter.

ILO technical cooperation projects are normally prepared and negotiated by the ILO technical adviser in the recipient country. The adviser is instructed to follow all relevant ILO and UNDP guidelines and to consult and coordinate with the UNDP resident representative and appropriate counterpart organization of the country.

After the project is approved by all parties--ILO, UNDP, and the Government--the ILO adviser is responsible for implementing the project and for working closely with the UNDP resident representative.

ILO recognizes the UNDP resident representative as the spokesman for the entire UNDP-financed program and as the focal point for contacts with government authorities. ILO field personnel are instructed to cooperate with the UNDP resident representative and to keep him informed of project activities, problems encountered, and plans for the future.

In the country we visited, we were told that the UNDP representative has a problem coordinating the visits by specialized agency officials on survey missions to determine how they can assist the country in their agencies' fields of competence. Also, direct communications take place between ministry heads and specialized agency officials. For example, the minister of labor has been in direct contact with the ILO Director General. The UNDP resident representative feels better communications on the part of these officials is needed so that he can keep abreast of issues being discussed and future plans being formulated.

ILO officials told us that their internal evaluation system is inadequate for technical cooperation projects. Project review and evaluation is done jointly by the host country, UNDP, and ILO, and, if appropriate, by special technical missions from ILO headquarters. ILO views this process as less than effective because it is carried out at too high a level and lacks evaluative objectives. Also, the results are not available to member countries unless specifically released by the host country. The State Department noted that national sovereignty is a tremendous restraint on evaluating the field programs of all U.N. specialized agencies.

Recent changes in procedures

To improve its internal evaluation capability, the ILO has recently:

- Created a management audit section within its Bureau of Program Budgeting and Management which will provide a source of management review within ILO by officials other than those responsible for the program being reviewed.
- Established a common register which lists all 1,500 technical assistance projects--regular and UNDP. This computerized system became operational in September 1976 and will eventually contain detailed project descriptions updated on a regular basis.
- Adopted and is now implementing the evaluation system used by the Agency for International Development which U.S. officials told us they have long advocated. The Agency and ILO officials believe it is the most important step in the area of evaluation. This system will require project objectives and benchmarks against which to measure the objectives. Periodic evaluations will be built into each project. We were told that the evaluation reports will be public information and available to members. ILO officials estimate it will be 2 to 3 years before the procedure is fully implemented.

U.S. EVALUATION EFFORTS ARE LIMITED

State Department

The Department of State identified three ways that the administrative and program effectiveness of ILO can be evaluated:

1. Through U.S. participation in ILO meetings, at which position papers on specific agenda items and recommendations on the biennial budget can be evaluated. However, U.S. officials acknowledge that using position papers limits evaluation to predetermined agenda items and does not necessarily focus on the areas most important to the United States.

2. Through the U.S. Mission in Geneva, which checks on specific ILO officials, the work they are performing, or ILO-sponsored projects. U.S. Embassies are generally responsible for monitoring and reporting on programs of international organizations. We were told that the Mission has never been asked for information on ILO programs. The Labor attache said that in his experience there has been little U.S. interest in ILO programs. Because he has not been asked for program information, he has seen no need to become familiar with the projects undertaken by the Organization.

3. Through annual field evaluations of ILO technical assistance programs. Although annual field evaluations could be helpful, we did not find any use being made of these reports with respect to ILO. The Agency for International Development representative in Geneva told us he receives annual field evaluation reports irregularly and has never been asked to take any action based on these reports.

Labor Department

The Department of Labor views the preparation and inter-departmental clearance of position papers for meetings of the Governing Body and annual Conference as the primary mechanism for evaluating the ILO's effectiveness. Labor has general responsibility, shared with Commerce, for technical labor subjects.

Although Labor agrees that an effective evaluation approach cannot stop with agenda items, it is not presently in a position to sufficiently evaluate ILO programs, make judgments about the relative impact of ILO programs, and actively promote those programs which seem to offer the greatest potential benefit. However, the Department is now in the process of improving its ability to review and evaluate ILO programs and has assigned additional staff members to begin detailed program analyses.

Labor also plans to establish a management information system which will incorporate input on programs of

other United Nations and regional organizations related to ILO programs, such as Food and Agriculture Organization programs affecting rural cooperatives, World Health Organization activities relating to occupational health personnel; and regional personnel development activities. Such a system will rely heavily on information which can best be supplied by the Department of State and other Federal agencies that deal with such organizations. Eventually, Labor could use such a pool of information to critically review the related programs of various international organizations as a whole and to suggest both economies and improvements to those programs.

ILO carries out a small number of in-depth reviews of selected areas each year as called for by the Governing Body; five in-depth reviews were scheduled for discussion by the Governing Body in 1976. The Department of Labor has, on a selective basis, prepared corresponding evaluations--the most recent being on international labor standards in 1975. The results of such reviews are debated before the Governing Body, with the final conclusions to be incorporated in future ILO activity.

In commenting on our draft report, the Department of Labor informed us of two new approaches to evaluating ILO field projects: periodic regional conferences of U.S. Labor attaches, and the establishment of tripartite evaluation teams by the ILO, a U.S. suggestion recently adopted by the Governing Body. If followed through on, these initiatives could improve the evaluation process.

Commerce Department

The Department of Commerce has not evaluated ILO activities except for its part in preparing U.S. position papers on predetermined agenda items and attendance at ILO meetings and conferences.

CONCLUSION

U.S. agencies have shown little initiative in attempting to evaluate ILO programs and activities, basically limiting their efforts to preparing position papers on items to come before ILO meetings and conferences. U.S. officials acknowledge this approach is not adequate to identify those programs and administration practices which offer the greatest potential benefit.

The Department of Labor has recently taken steps to improve its evaluation capability and, if the United States remains a member, plans to emphasize detailed review of

selected ILO activities. With U.S. encouragement, the ILO is establishing an internal evaluation system for technical cooperation projects. These are important initial steps, but we believe evaluation should be a joint effort of the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce, with input from other agencies and employer and worker groups as appropriate.

We believe that close coordination with State is particularly important because of its financial responsibility for the budget.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Our 1970 report on ILO recommended that (1) the United States develop definitive and measurable objectives and implement a plan for achieving them and (2) the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce obtain better budget, program, and operational data and make more effective analyses and evaluations of ILO projects and programs. We repeated these recommendations in a followup report issued in 1974. Although State said that it generally agreed with our recommendations, it has taken virtually no action to implement them.

In 1970, U.S. political and technical assistance objectives for ILO were broadly defined and difficult to measure. Since then, relations with ILO have deteriorated to such an extent that the United States in 1975 gave notice that it intends to withdraw from the Organization unless the problems can be resolved. Today, less than a year before U.S. withdrawal becomes final, no overall statement of U.S. objectives for ILO has been developed.

Generally, agency objectives do not address the question of what the United States wants ILO to accomplish. They were developed independently according to each agency's interests. Neither the U.S. Mission in Geneva nor the employer or worker groups were consulted. State and Commerce objectives are short term. The U.S. Mission is not aware of any objectives other than political issues raised in our notice of intent to withdraw. Labor is only beginning to develop overall objectives for ILO, but these objectives are as yet imprecise. The absence of specific long-term program objectives is in consonance with the general U.S. lack of familiarity with ILO programs.

The agencies should each continue to formulate their own formal objectives in pursuing their ILO interest, but there should be coordination among them to make sure that agencies' objectives are in harmony with overall U.S. objectives. To achieve maximum benefit from U.S. participation in ILO, objectives should be coordinated among the agencies, the U.S. Mission, and employer and worker representatives.

ILO's planning and budgeting documents today are still too general to permit meaningful analysis. The Department of Labor has initiated actions to obtain information in addition to that contained in the budget documents and has

added additional staff to the section charged with the analysis responsibility. However, it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of these actions. Labor basically has been working alone in this area, and we believe it should coordinate with and seek the input of the Departments of State and Commerce as well as that of the employer and worker representatives.

U.S. agencies have shown little initiative in evaluating ILO programs and activities, basically limiting their efforts to preparing position papers on ILO meeting agenda. The Department of Labor has recognized the need for more effective evaluation and plans to improve its evaluation capability. We believe evaluation should be a joint effort of the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce, with input from other agencies and employer and worker groups as appropriate.

Between 1970 and 1975 the United States became increasingly dissatisfied with the direction taken by the ILO, partly because U.S. participation had been given such low priority.

In November 1975, the United States submitted a notice of intent to withdraw but promised to give high priority to promoting conditions to facilitate continued participation. By November 1977, the United States must decide whether to withdraw from or remain in ILO. U.S. agencies have taken steps to improve U.S. participation only since the notice of intent to withdraw.

However, our review showed that past U.S. participation in ILO was one of crisis management alternated with periods of neglect. As each crisis with ILO subsides, U.S. attention also subsides.

In the present crisis, no long-term commitment to improve U.S. participation has yet been demonstrated. Thus, if the United States does remain a member of the Organization, U.S. participation could very easily revert to the low levels of interest demonstrated before the letter was submitted. We believe the agencies should clearly state their long-term objectives for U.S. participation in the ILO. Such a statement will enable the agencies to help formulate a recommendation to the President whether or not to withdraw because the decision will be based, in part, on what the United States will gain by continuing its membership.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that before November 1977 the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce:

--Develop overall objectives for U.S. participation in the Organization.

--Coordinate these objectives with the employer and worker representatives.

--Develop a strategy for achieving the objectives, making sure that, if the United States remains a member, it maintains a high level of interest so that recent initiatives by U.S. agencies can be further developed and carried out.

AGENCIES COMMENTS

Although GAO did not follow its usual procedure of obtaining formal agency comments, the draft report was discussed with key officials of State, Labor, and Commerce. These officials believe that the development and implementation of program objectives would give the impression that the United States had decided to remain in the organization and that such objectives have no role to play in the final decision on U.S. membership. However, if the United States remains in ILO, the agencies propose to make program objectives a first priority. The basic objective of U.S. agencies in the short term is to reverse the trend toward politicization of ILO.

We believe that the continued lack of U.S. program objectives raises questions about the effectiveness of the U.S. stated commitment to improve the quality of its participation. The absence of a commitment in the past contributed to the current situation. U.S. agencies agreed with our conclusion that without continued high-level Government interest, U.S. participation would deteriorate.

The Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce believe that we should have reported on the objectives of the nongovernmental participants. The agencies indicated that the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO also lack specific long-range objectives. Our discussions with officials from these nongovernmental organizations disclosed no formalized and specific long-range objectives. We talked to the worker and employer representatives and their views are reflected in the report.

The Department of State agreed that Agency program participation could be improved but felt that the key to such improvement was additional staff, particularly budget analysts, for the International Organization Affairs Bureau.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
 GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

July 30, 1976

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats
 Comptroller General of the United States
 U. S. General Accounting Office
 441 G Street, N. W.
 Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Elmer:

As you know, the Committee on Government Operations is currently reviewing United States involvement in international organizations.

We are familiar with the reports the General Accounting Office has issued, the testimony you have given before various Congressional committees, and your continuing concern with improving the management of U. S. participation in international organizations.


To assist the Committee I would request that GAO update its previous work by the middle of next February, including an update of your prior reports on the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. I hope you would be prepared to testify before the Committee, possibly in the early part of the next session, on your conclusions.

I would also like to have by next February a report on your current review of employment of Americans by international organizations and a report on the World Food Program and our participation in it. I would also be interested in any review you can do of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

I hope that you can also consider in your work the overall management and budgetary systems of the U.N., and especially the status of your efforts to encourage the establishment of independent review and evaluation systems in international organizations.

I look forward with interest to learning your thinking in this important area.

Sincerely yours,


 Abe Ribicoff

U.S. DELEGATION
TO THE 61st SESSION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE

JUNE 1976

REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DELEGATES

Daniel L. Horowitz (chairman)
Special Assistant to the Secretary
for ILO Affairs
Department of Labor

Dale Good
Special Assistant to the Secretary and
Coordinator of International Labor Affairs
Department of State

ALTERNATE DELEGATE

Randall G. Upton
ILO Affairs Coordinator
Domestic and International Business Administration
Department of Commerce

CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS

The Honorable
John Ashbrook
United States House of Representatives

The Honorable
Frank Thompson, Jr.
United States House of Representatives

ADVISERS

Catherine E. Bocskor
Staff Attorney
Division of General Legal Services
Solicitor's Office
Department of Labor

John T. Doherty
Labor Attache'
United States Mission to the
European Community
Brussels, Belgium

Helen V. Foerst
Assistant Chief Nurse Officer
Public Health Service
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Donald E. MacKenzie
Assistant Regional Director for Occupational
Safety and Health
Department of Labor
Atlanta, Georgia

James A. Mattson
Regional Labor Attache
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State

Robert F. Pfeiffer
Labor Attache
United States Mission
Geneva, Switzerland

James H. Quackenbush
Director, ILO Affairs
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
Department of Labor

Donald S. Shire
Associate Solicitor for General Legal Service
Solicitor's Office
Department of Labor

Lester P. Slezak
Labor and Social Affairs Adviser
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State

Bobbye D. Spears
Regional Solicitor
Department of Labor
Atlanta, Georgia

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Cleveland, Ohio

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Director of Nursing
American Hospital Association
Chicago, Illinois

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Wilmington, Delaware

Carl H. Madden
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Chamber of Commerce of the United States
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New York, New York

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The Chase Manhattan Bank
New York, New York

Gerard C. Smetana
Attorney at Law
Partner, Borovsky, Smetana,
Ehrlich & Kronenburg
Chicago, Illinois

George F. Sorn
Manager, Labor Division
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association
Orlando, Florida

James F. Steiner
ILO Advisor
Chamber of Commerce of the United States
Washington, D.C.

John R. Wall
Vice President, Personnel
Republic Steel Corporation
Cleveland, Ohio

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

DELEGATE

Irving Brown
International Representative
American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Paris, France

ADVISERS

Michael Boggs
Assistant Director, Department of
International Affairs
American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations
Washington, D.C.

David Brombart
Assistant to the Executive Director
African-American Labor Center
New York, New York

Sol C. Chaikin, President
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
New York, New York

Jesse Friedman, Regional Director
American Institute for Free Labor Development
Washington, D.C.

D. Patrick Greathouse
Vice President
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
Detroit, Michigan

Paul Hall
President
Seafarers International Union
of North America
Brooklyn, New York

Edward Hickey
Attorney at Law
Washington, D.C.

James T. Housewright
President
Retail Clerks International Association
Washington, D.C.

Lane Kirkland
Secretary-Treasurer
AFL-CIO
Washington, D.C.

John J. Muth
Deputy for Field Activities
Asian-American Free Labor Institute
Washington, D.C.

Gerard P. O'Keefe
Director, International Department
Retail Clerks International Association
Washington, D.C.

Bert Seidman
Director, Department of Social Security
AFL-CIO
Washington, D.C.

Albert Shanker
President
American Federation of Teachers
Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II

J. C. Turner
President
International Union of Operating Engineers
Washington, D.C.

Martin J. Ward
President
United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe
Fitting Industry of the United States
and Canada
Washington, D.C.

November 5, 1975

Dear Mr. Director General:

This letter constitutes notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from the International Labor Organization. It is transmitted pursuant to Article 1, Paragraph 5, of the Constitution of the Organization, which provides that a member may withdraw provided that a notice of intention to withdraw has been given two years earlier to the Director General and subject to the member having at that time fulfilled all financial obligations arising out of its membership.

Rather than express regret at this action, I would prefer to express confidence in what will be its ultimate outcome. The United States does not desire to leave the ILO. The United States does not expect to do so. But we do intend to make every possible effort to promote the conditions which will facilitate our continued participation. If this should prove impossible, we are in fact prepared to depart.

American relations with the ILO are older, and perhaps deeper, than with any other international organization. It is a very special relationship, such that only extraordinary developments could ever have brought us to this point. The American labor movement back into the 19th Century was associated with the international movement to establish a world organization which would advance the interests of workers through collective bargaining and social legislation.

The Honorable

The Director General,

International Labor Organization,

Geneva, Switzerland.

Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, was Chairman of the Commission which drafted the ILO constitution at the Paris Peace Conference. The first meeting of the International Labor Conference took place in Washington, that same year. In 1934 the United States joined the ILO, the first and only of the League of Nations organizations which it did join. The Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944 reaffirmed the Organization's fundamental principles and reformulated its aims and objectives in order to guide its role in the postwar period. Two Americans have served with distinction as Directors-General: Many Americans have contributed to the work of the Organization. Most particularly, the ILO has been the object of sustained attention and support by three generations of representatives of American workers and American employers.

In recent years, support has given way to increasing concern. I would emphasize that this concern has been most intense on the part of precisely those groups which would generally be regarded in the United States as the most progressive and forward-looking in matters of social policy. It has been precisely those groups most desirous that the United States and other nations should move forward in social matters, which have been most concerned that the ILO--incredible as it may seem--has been falling back. With no pretense to comprehensiveness, I should like to present four matters of fundamental concern.

1. The Erosion of Tripartite Representation

The ILO exists as an organization in which representatives of workers, employers, and governments may come together to further mutual interests. The constitution of the ILO is predicated on the existence within member states of relatively independent and reasonably self-defined and self-directed worker and employer groups. The United States fully recognizes that these assumptions, which may have been warranted on the part of the Western democracies which drafted the ILO constitution in 1919, have not worked out everywhere in

in the world; in truth only a minority of the nations of the world today have anything resembling industrial democracy, just as only a minority can lay claim to political democracy. The United States recognizes that revising the practices and arrangements of the ILO is not going to restore the world of 1919 or of 1944. It would be intolerable for us to demand that it do so. On the other hand, it is equally intolerable for other states to insist that as a condition of participating in the ILO we should give up our liberties simply because they have another political system. We will not. Some accommodation will have to be found, and some surely can be found. But if none is, the United States will not submit passively to what some, mistakenly, may suppose to be the march of history. In particular, we cannot accept the workers' and employers' groups in the ILO falling under the domination of governments.

2. Selective concern for human rights.

The ILO conference for some years now has shown an appallingly selective concern in the application of the ILO's basic conventions on freedom of association and forced labor. It pursues the violation of human rights in some member states. It grants immunity from such citations to others. This seriously undermines the credibility of the ILO's support of freedom of association, which is central to its tripartite structure, and strengthens the proposition that these human rights are not universally applicable, but rather are subject to different interpretations for states with different political systems.

3. Disregard of due process

The ILO once had an enviable record of objectivity and concern for due process in its examination of alleged violations of basic human rights by its member states. The constitution of the ILO provides for procedures to handle representations and complaints that a member state is not observing a convention which it has ratified. Further, it was the ILO which first established fact-finding and conciliation machinery to respond to allegations of violations of trade union rights. In recent years, however, sessions of the ILO conference increasingly have adopted resolutions concerning particular member states which happen to be the political target of the moment, in utter disregard of the established procedures and machinery. This trend is accelerating, and it is gravely damaging the ILO and its capacity to pursue its objectives in the human rights field.

4. The increasing politicization of the organization

In recent years the ILO has become increasingly and excessively involved in political issues which are quite beyond the competence and mandate of the organization. The ILO does have a legitimate and necessary interest in certain issues with political ramifications. It has major responsibility, for example, for international action to promote and protect fundamental human rights, particularly in respect of freedom of association, trade union rights and the abolition of forced labor. But international politics is not the main business of the ILO. Questions involving relations between states and proclamations of economic principles should be left to the United Nations and other international agencies where their consideration is more relevant to those organizations' responsibilities. Irrelevant political issues divert the attention of the ILO from improving the conditions of workers--that is, from questions on which the tripartite structure of the ILO gives the organization a unique advantage over the other, purely governmental, organizations of the UN family.

In sum, the ILO which this nation has so strongly supported appears to be turning away from its basic aims and objectives and increasingly to be used for purposes which serve the interests of neither the workers for which the organization was established nor nations which are committed to free trade unions and an open political process.

The international labor office and the member states of the organization have for years been aware that these trends have reduced support in the United States for the ILO. It is possible, however, that the bases and depth of concern in the United States have not been adequately understood or appreciated.

I hope that this letter will contribute to a fuller appreciation of the current attitude of the United States toward the ILO. In due course the United States will be obliged to consider whether or not it wishes to carry out the intention stated in this letter and to withdraw from the ILO. During the next two years the U.S. for its part will work constructively within the ILO to help the organization return to its basic principles and to a fuller achievement of its fundamental objectives.

To this end, the President is establishing a Cabinet level committee to consider how this goal may be achieved. The committee will of course consult with worker and employer representatives, as has been our practice for some four decades now in the formulation of our ILO policy. The committee will also enter into the closest consultations with the Congress, to the end that a unified and purposeful American position should emerge.

Respectfully,

Henry A. Kissinger

OFFICIALS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGINGU.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

	<u>Appointed or commissioned</u>
SECRETARY OF STATE:	
Cyrus R. Vance	Jan. 1977
Henry A. Kissinger	Sept. 1973
William P. Rogers	Jan. 1969
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS:	
Charles W. Maynes (designee)	Jan. 1977
Samuel W. Lewis	Dec. 1975
William B. Buffum	Feb. 1974
David H. Popper	June 1973
Samuel DePalma	Feb. 1969
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND CO-ORDINATOR OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS:	
Dale E. Good	Apr. 1973
Daniel L. Horowitz	May 1971
George P. Delaney	Mar. 1963
SECRETARY OF LABOR:	
F. Ray Marshall	Jan. 1977
William J. Usery	Feb. 1976
John T. Dunlop	Mar. 1975
Peter J. Brennan	Nov. 1972
James D. Hodgson	July 1970
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS AND COUNSELOR TO THE CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEE:	
Daniel L. Horowitz	Jan. 1976
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE:	
Juanita Kreps	Jan. 1977
Elliot L. Richardson	Feb. 1976
Rogers C. B. Morton	May 1975
John K. Tabor (acting)	Mar. 1975
Frederick B. Dent	Feb. 1973
Peter G. Peterson	Feb. 1972
Maurice H. Stans	Jan. 1969

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX IV

**Appointed or
commissioned**

**DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE REPRESENTATIVE AS
SUBSTITUTE DELEGATE TO ILO CONFERENCE:**

Randall G. Upton
Allen R. DeLong

Sept. 1974
June 1969

**EMPLOYER DELEGATE TO INTERNATIONAL LABOR
CONFERENCE:**

Charles E. Smith, Jr.
Edward P. Neilan

June 1974
June 1966

**WORKER DELEGATE TO INTERNATIONAL LABOR
CONFERENCE:**

Irving Brown
Bert Seidman
Rudolph Faupl

June 1975
June 1972
June 1958